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1.   Introduction 
 
Developments in Grocery Retailing and Associated Policy Issues 
Retailers represent the final and therefore the most visible point of the grocery supply 
chain for most consumers.  Developments at this level consequently have a direct 
effect on consumer interests in relation to price, choice and quality of products on 
offer.  In the last couple of decades the face of grocery retailing has changed 
significantly with the emergence of new, large-store formats and the increased 
prevalence of large retail chains.  These developments have offered consumers 
increased shopping convenience through superstores offering one-stop shopping for 
food and other daily consumer goods.1  However, with consumers’ shopping habits 
changing in favour of these large-store formats the consequence has been a sharp 
decline in the number of traditional and specialist retailers.  This pattern of 
development has been common across most of Europe. 
 
Yet it is not just consumers which have been affected by these developments.  As 
grocery retailing has consolidated and concentrated as an activity, large chain-store 
retailers have emerged commanding significant shares of national markets.  This 
development has facilitated a marked change in the nature of supplier-retailer 
relations where increasingly retailers hold the whip hand, with supply chains being 
now fundamentally retailer-driven.  Here, the substantial market shares held by the 
leading retailers have offered them increased ability to exercise substantial buyer 
power over suppliers.  With their control of shelf space and the greatly reduced 
number of competitors, therefore offering fewer alternatives for suppliers seeking a 
route to market, these large retailers have in effect become “gatekeepers” for access to 
consumers.  This in turn has allowed these large retailers greater prospect of obtaining 
price concessions from suppliers as well as being able to charge suppliers directly for 
access to their stores (e.g. through listing charges or shelf-space fees) and impose 
other restraints on suppliers (such as exclusive supply obligations).  These benefits lie 
in the hands of the largest retailers, reinforcing their competitive advantage over 
smaller retailers and enhancing their power to dictate terms and conditions to 
suppliers.  This leads to credible concerns about detrimental effects on competition at 
both the retail level and at the supplier level, where the viability of small (and large) 
suppliers may be considerably undermined by retailer buyer power. 
 
These issues are, of course, not new for policy makers and competition authorities.  
They have, for example, been considered in the context of merger decisions (e.g. the 
European Commission’s analysis of proposed concentrations concerning Kesko/Tuko2 
in Finland and Rewe/Meinl3 in Austria).  They have also been considered in relation to 
monopoly investigations into supermarkets (e.g. the UK Competition Commission’s 
(2000) investigation).  The lessons are clear that while consolidation can undoubtedly 
offer significant efficiency improvements to the benefit of society it can equally work 
the other way when it leads to restricted competition. 
 
 
                                                 
1  By the term “daily consumer goods” is meant the provision of items collectively referred to as “fast-
moving consumer goods” sold by grocery stores which in addition to food include domestic cleaning 
materials, toiletries, household goods, pet food, etc. 
2   Kesko/Tuko, Case No IV/M.784 (OJEC L110, 26/4/1997). 
3   Rewe/Meinl, Case No IV/M.1221 (OJEC L274, 23/10/1999). 
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Retailer Consolidation and Collaboration 
Thus far authorities have tended to take a generally benign view towards retailer 
consolidation.  However, competition concerns must be seen as very real in view of 
the apparently relentless consolidation process operating whereby the largest retailers 
continue to gain market share at the expense of smaller retailers. Moreover, the 
playing field is tilted even further in favour of large retailers than indicated simply by 
shares of retail sales.  An aspect, often overlooked, concerns the real extent of 
consolidation on the buying side when full account is taken of collaboration between 
retailers in purchasing supplies.  This point is significant since it not just that 
individual retailers have increased their control of market share but that through 
collaborating with other retailers they can gain increased buying power as part of a 
buyer group or buyer alliance.  There is an important Community dimension here 
since collaboration is increasingly of a cross-border nature. 
 
Indeed, it is at the Community level where current developments are most noticeable.  
While national level consolidation continues, the major leap in the last few years has 
been in terms of consolidation at the aggregate EU level.  This paper estimates that 
the ten largest retailers control 30% of all retail food sales in the European Union.4  
Yet, the real extent of consolidation on the buyer side is made more significant by the 
operation of cross-border retailer alliances such as EMD and AMS (see Table 5 
below).  In this regard, it appears that the leading seven cross-border alliances 
together with the three largest non-affiliated retailers account for over half of retail 
grocery supplies throughout the whole Union.  While these alliances are presently not 
formal groups in the sense of complete central purchasing, there certainly appears to 
be moves towards greater co-ordination between members, for example over own-
label contracts.  The introduction of the Euro as the key currency in the Community, 
and the immediate price transparency that this entails for cross-country comparisons, 
will no doubt further facilitate moves to greater co-ordination within these alliances. 
 
In principle, then, just a handful of organisations control or have potential to influence 
the bulk of purchases from producers.  This is not a small matter given that the level 
of grocery sales is estimated at nearly E900 billion across the EU.  But continued 
consolidation through cross-border mergers and acquisitions is serving to add to the 
web of relations amongst retailers by extending links across previously separate 
alliances.  These extended links offer further potential for exchange of price 
information in regard to previously private negotiations with suppliers.  In this sense 
the prospect of alliances serving the role of a buyers' cartel are increased.  An 
additional concern would be if this purchasing co-ordination spilled over to retail 
price co-ordination.  Previously this prospect was remote when cross-border alliances 
did not involve direct competitors (typically involving just one member per state).  
But with overlapping membership, the prospect of co-ordination in national retail 
markets should be seen as a concern. 
 
Online Exchanges 
Tied to these developments has been the expanded use of business-to-business 
(“B2B”) electronic commerce and Internet-based auctions.  The latter, in particular, 
are playing an increasingly important role in awarding supply contracts for unbranded 
                                                 
4  This estimate may be on the conservative side. Other sources report higher levels of aggregate 
concentration.  For instance M+M Eurodata (at www.mmeurodata.de) has reported the extent of control 
held by the ten largest retailers as approaching 40% of retail grocery sales. 
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and own-label products by the largest retail groups, with moves in this direction by 
the major buyer alliances as well.  This has entailed a shift away from the 
development of long-term supplier-retailer partnerships in favour of short-term price-
based contracting (where the lowest price offered can win the entire contract).  The 
impact on supplier viability and damage to long-term efficiency when investment 
decisions may be distorted by short-term concerns (given the uncertainty of winning 
contracts) has thus far received scant attention by authorities and policy-makers. 
There are also issues raised about ensuring quality thresholds are maintained (given 
the pressure that suppliers are under to cut corners in the face of retailer-orchestrated 
ultra-intense supplier competition).  The concern is that such contracting could result 
in instances of sub-standard or faulty products being sold which consumers may not 
be immediately aware of and which may initially go undetected by retailers and 
quality-control agencies (such as Trading Standards or the Food Standards Agency in 
the UK). 
 
While the use of B2B electronic commerce is to be broadly welcomed as reducing 
costs and improving overall efficiency within the supply chain, there are accordingly 
public interest issues that need to be addressed particularly in relation to the changing 
nature of supplier-retailer relations.  The use of Internet auctions appear socially 
beneficial where it leads to reduced consumer prices at no loss of product quality and 
without endangering the viability and long-term efficiency of suppliers.  The point 
made here is that the system could potentially be open to abuse and supply-chain 
efficiency and consumer welfare may suffer as a result if appropriate measures are not 
put in place. 
 
Outline 
This present report explores all of these emerging features in European grocery 
retailing, taking account of the patterns of consolidation and collaboration amongst 
retailers.  The paper seeks to assess the economic impact of these changes and, where 
appropriate, consider policy measures to ensure that healthy competition and 
efficiency prevails to the ultimate benefit of consumers.  The key message is that there 
is a greater need for co-ordination between national authorities through the European 
Commission to develop consistent policy towards grocery retailing and procurement 
given the increasing Community dimension to retailing issues and the breaking down 
of national boundaries in economic markets served.  This calls not only for consistent 
treatment of mergers and anti-competitive practices but also a greater awareness of 
the need to develop common policy against economic exploitation of dependency 
relationships, given the long-term economic damage this causes. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  The next section considers the economic welfare 
issues involved.  Section 3 provides some background detail on the pattern of retail 
concentration across the different member states of the European Union, highlighting 
the extent of market share accounted by the major retailers at both the national level 
and at the Community level.  Section 4 builds on this to consider a fuller assessment 
of consolidation by taking account of retailer collaboration arising from the 
development of national buyer groups and cross-border buying alliances influencing 
procurement markets.  Section 5 discusses the impact of these developments on retail 
competition.  The implications for producers are then considered in Section 6.  
Section 7 sets out a policy framework for tackling the anti-competitive effects of 
retailer power.  The paper ends with a summary of conclusions.  
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2. Economic Welfare Issues 
 
Benefits v. Costs 
It is undeniable that the profound changes that have taken place in food retailing over 
recent years have offered considerable economic advantages.  Heavy investment by 
retailers has allowed them to reap economies of scale through the operation of large-
store formats and the benefits from operating large chains of stores.  This has been 
supported by the implementation of sophisticated logistics and distribution systems 
married with significant investment in new technology (such as Electronic Point of 
Sale).  The result has been significantly improved efficiency with greater sales per 
outlet and per employee. 
 
Generally these changes have been beneficial for consumers.  Greater convenience 
has been afforded by the development of one-stop shops offering in excess of 20,000 
product lines and it is conceivable that lower prices have occurred where the cost 
savings from the improved efficiency have been passed on to consumers.  The cost for 
consumers, though, has been the been the decline of traditional retailing, offering 
specialisation or location convenience, and a move towards greater homogenisation of 
retailing where fascias are fewer in number and have greater similarity in the retail 
offer.  In some areas, the decline in competition and alternative stores for consumers 
has already reached the point where store choice has become very limited.  This was 
for example evident from the EC’s consideration of the Kesko/Tuko and Rewe/Meinl 
proposed mergers.  With further consolidation at the retail level this problem of an 
absence of local competition may be expected to increase and become a more 
widespread feature across member states.  This particular aspect calls for vigilance by 
competition authorities and consideration of whether instructed store divestments 
should be used to ensure that local competition remains effective.  
 
Protecting Suppliers 
While consumer welfare has been the prime focus of public concern and interest by 
competition authorities, the aspect of grocery retailers exercising buyer (or 
“monopsony”) power as well as seller (“monopoly”) power has come to prominence.  
Indeed, consideration of the effects of retail buyer power was not only a key feature of 
the UK Competition Commission’s recent investigation but has also been an aspect of 
recent EC decisions on retail mergers. 
 
The Competition Commission found that five multiples had sufficient buyer power 
that 30 practices identified by the Commission ‘adversely affect the competitiveness 
of some of their suppliers and distort competition in the supplier market - and in some 
cases in the retail market - for the supply of groceries’. The result of the practices was 
that ‘suppliers are likely to invest less and spend less on new product development 
and innovation, leading to lower quality and less consumer choice. This is likely to 
result in fewer new entrants to the supplier market than otherwise. Certain of the 
practices give the major buyers substantial advantages over other smaller retailers, 
whose competitiveness is likely to suffer as a result, again leading to a reduction in 
consumer choice’ (paragraph 1.11).  Although the Commission recognised some 
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advantages in buyer power and offsetting benefits it nonetheless concluded that 27 of 
the practices found operate against the public interest.5 
 
The practices identified by the Competition Commission covered a wide range of 
aspects in regard to contractual and operational relations concerning trading with 
suppliers.  The Competition Commission usefully grouped the practices into eight 
different categories.  Table 1 lists these categories and shows the number of different 
practices in each category found to operate against the public interest based on 
distortion to supplier competition and/or distortion to retailer competition.   As can be 
seen, while competition concerns were raised for all categories, four categories 
accounted for all but two of the identified practices found to be operating against the 
public interest.  
 
Table 1 - Supermarket practices related to relations with suppliers 
 
Category of Practices Number of Practices 
Against Public Interest 
Payments for access to shelf space 
 
4 
Imposing conditions on suppliers’ trade 
with other retailers 
0 
Applying different standards to different 
suppliers 
1 
Imposing an unfair imbalance of risk 
 
10 
Imposing retrospective changes to 
contractual terms 
6 
Restricting suppliers’ access to the 
market 
0 
Imposing charges and transferring costs 
to suppliers 
5 
Requiring suppliers to use third party 
suppliers nominated by the retailer 
1 
 
Source: Competition Commission (2000) 
 
At the recommendation of the Competition Commission, a code of practice has 
recently been established, intended to eliminate or at least restrict these anti-
competitive practices with compliance required by the four largest supermarket 
groups (each accounting for in excess of 8% of the retail grocery market).  
 
However, whether protection against powerful, opportunistically behaving buyers 
should generally be afforded to suppliers remains contentious.  In some countries, 
notably France and Germany, so-called economic dependency laws can serve to 
protect suppliers against abusive exploitation, but mainly in regard to post-contractual 
                                                 
5 The full list of practices identified by the Competition Commission is in a spreadsheet in Appendix 
11.3 of its report.  This identifies the practices (numbered ID1 to ID52) and charts which of the 
multiples engages in each practice and records their comments on each practice.  The practices 
themselves are explained and discussed in detail on pages 98-136.  The practices determined as being 
anti-competitive are listed in Table 2.14 of the CC report. 
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opportunism.  But cases are notoriously difficult to prove and suppliers are reluctant 
to make complaints (for fear of reprisals).6  The more general approach is to consider 
practices in regard to whether they distort, restrict or prevent competition along the 
lines of EC Articles 81 and 82 or their equivalents, e.g. the UK’s Competition Act 
1998.  But thus far authorities have been reluctant to prohibit restrictive practices 
placed on suppliers.  Even the Competition Commission’s report did not lead to the 
recommendation that anti-competitive practices be prohibited outright but rather 
constrained by a Code of Practice.7  More generally, authorities appear unwilling to 
prohibit retailer practices that potentially offer both efficiency benefits and anti-
competitive effects even if they serve to reinforce buyer power.8  
 
Consolidation throughout Europe  
As to broader sector developments, it appears that the distinctiveness of national retail 
markets is being eroded.  While national differences will continue in some aspects, 
mainly in relation to differences in consumer purchasing behaviour and the existing 
institutional set-ups, there is a clear trend indicating future convergence.  Grocery 
retailing is increasingly becoming polarised between large hypermarket retailers and 
small convenience or discount store operators, with intermediate supermarket chains 
and unaffiliated independent retailers declining.  This process is generally taking 
place across the EU, if at different speeds.  But a noticeable feature is the rate at 
which markets such as Spain and Portugal, until recently highly fragmented, have 
consolidated as a result of multinational retailer expansion into these markets.  This 
process is being initiated in the remaining unconcentrated markets of Italy and Greece 
and if effective will leave nearly all EU countries with high levels of retail 
concentration. 
 
Indeed further afield, moves by the leading multinational retailers into Eastern Europe 
are already having a noticeable consolidating effect on countries such as Poland, 
Czech Republic, and Hungary.  Thus, it is not inconceivable that at some future point 
retailers and buyer groups may be seeking to obtain supplies from producers on a 
fully European scale.  Thus whilst retail markets remain local for consumers (with the 
typical catchment area represented by a 10 or 15-minute consumer drive time) on the 
procurement side the market may encompass the entire continent. 
 
                                                 
6  Even if a case is taken up it may well fail because of the requirements of showing economic 
dependence, abuse and an effect on the market – see Ratliff (1998) and Vogel (1998). 
7  For some commentators even this is a move too far in what they regard as interference in normal 
business practice – see for example “Leader: A super market”, Financial Times, 27/8/2001. 
8   An interesting case concerns slotting allowances.  This practice has been extensively analysed in the 
US by the Federal Trade Commission and other public bodies. Thus far no action has been taken to 
prohibit or even discourage the practice – see Davis (2001) for a summary and Cotterill (2001) for 
more general discussion in the context of US grocery market developments. 
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3.   Consolidation in European Grocery Retailing 
 
To provide some insight into the extent of changes taking place in European grocery 
retailing this section provides some background information on the extent of national 
and international consolidation in the sector.  In general, from a once largely 
fragmented sector, grocery retailing and procurement in Europe has become 
increasingly concentrated both at the national level and at the aggregate EU level.   
Where once retail markets were highly fragmented, consisting predominantly of 
traditional independent retailers, they have become highly consolidated, driven by a 
process of organic growth and mergers by leading retailers.  The result has been the 
marginalisation of small independent retailers, restricted to acting as convenience 
stores (for so-called top-up shopping), and market domination by a limited number of 
large-format, multiple-store retailers that attract the bulk of consumer spending.  
Increasingly, the very largest retail corporations have also sought to extend their 
operations internationally, in the process increasing aggregate concentration across 
the EU.  
 
National Consolidation Trends 
The consolidation process has occurred across all countries to a greater or lesser 
extent but the general trend is one of apparent relentless increase over time.  Table 2 
shows the levels of retail concentration across EU member states for 1993-1999.  
 
Table  2 - Five-Firm Concentration (%) in Grocery and Daily 
Goods Retailing for EU Member States (1993-1999) 
  1993 1996 1999 
Austria  54.2 58.6 60.2 
Belgium+Luxembourg 60.2 61.6 60.9 
Denmark  54.2 59.5 56.4 
Finland  93.5 89.1 68.4 
France  47.5 50.6 56.3 
Germany  45.1 45.4 44.1 
Greece  10.9 25.8 26.8 
Ireland  62.6 64.2 58.3 
Italy  10.9 11.8 17.6 
Netherlands 52.5 50.4 56.2 
Portugal  36.5 55.7 63.2 
Spain  21.6 32.1 40.3 
Sweden  79.3 77.9 78.2 
UK  50.2 56.2 63.0 
EU 15 (weighted av) 40.7 43.7 48.9 
       
Source: Estimates based on data from Corporate Intelligence on Retailing’s European 
Retail Handbook (various years) 
 
The market share figures reported in the table are relative to all retail sales of food and 
daily consumer goods in each member state.  Clearly market shares based just on sales 
in grocery retail outlets would give higher market share figures than those reported 
here.9  Nevertheless, even with this broad based measure of market size, the table 
                                                 
9   This point is important since it should be noted that the market base in Table 2 is the retail sales of 
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highlights the notable increases in the market share controlled by the five leading 
retailers in particular countries in just a few years.  The overall (weighted) average 
concentration across the 15 member states increased by 20% over the six year period 
shown.10 
 
Internationalisation and EU-wide Consolidation 
However, it is not only at the national level that significant increases in concentration 
have occurred.  Increasingly, the major retailers have sought to expand 
internationally.  Wal-Mart, the world’s second largest company with $193bn global 
turnover and 1,244,000 employees, has become a major player in Europe through key 
acquisitions in the UK and Germany.  At the same time, Carrefour’s recent merger 
with Promodès has created Europe’s largest and the world’s second largest retailer, 
consolidating its dominant position in France and Spain and increasing its position 
considerably in other countries.  Other major retailers, notably from Germany (Rewe, 
Metro, Aldi and Edeka), France (ITM Intermarché, Auchan and Leclerc) and the UK 
(Tesco), have meanwhile strengthened their domestic and international positions. 
 
Indeed, the concerted international as well as domestic expansion by the very leading 
food retailers has meant that they are increasingly taking a larger share of overall sales 
away from other retailers.  The result has been a sharp increase in aggregate 
concentration across the EU.  The top ten retailers in the EU now account for over 
30% of sales of all food and daily goods.  As shown in Table 3, this level has 
increased by some 25% in just six years.  Moreover, it is clear that the top ten, or at 
most the top twenty, retailers are pulling away in growth terms from the rest.  For 
instance, while the share accounted for by the leading 50 retailers was 49% in 1999, 
the level had only increased by 7.7% over the previous six years.  As evidenced by the 
breakdown of rankings into decile groups, it is apparent that only the top two groups 
(1-10 and 11-20) increased their share, while those ranked lower accounted for 
reduced shares over time. 
 
The evidence from Tables 2 and 3 clearly points to a considerably more consolidated 
retail sector at the national level as well as at the Community level.  The leading 
retailers have strengthened their domestic positions and have expanded internationally 
to the point where a handful of leading players account for a large proportion of retail 
sales of food and daily products across Europe.  It is on these major retailers, with 
their enormous buying power, that the livelihood of most suppliers depends. 
                                                                                                                                            
all food and all daily consumer items.  Accordingly, these figures understate the level of concentration 
specific to items sold as prepared grocery or daily goods and predominantly identified with grocery 
stores.  Other sources tend to show higher levels of retail concentration against this narrower base.  For 
instance, AC Nielsen figures show that for 1999 the market shares of the five majors in grocery were in 
Austria 93%, Belgium 72%, Denmark 84%, Finland 83%, France 83%, Germany 76%, Greece 45%, 
Italy 31%, Netherlands 95%, Portugal 54%, Spain 51%, Sweden 95%, and UK 71%.  Also, figures 
vary by store size classes, which may be relevant in defining appropriate economic markets.  In the 
UK, for example, the Competition Commission (2000) found that the top five retailers accounted for 
69.2% of sales of grocery and daily products but that the top five grocers accounted for 75.6% of stores 
over 600 sq.m. and 89.3% of stores over 1,400 sq.m. (i.e. of superstore/hypermarket size).  
10   Notice that there is considerable variation in consolidation patterns across the countries. Also, these 
national level figures, of course, hide the fact that from the consumer’s perspective the relevant market 
is local in nature (e.g. within 15 minutes drive time), and that he/she is restricted in choice to the local 
stores operating in the vicinity.  Here, there may be only one store (i.e. a local monopoly) but rarely 
more than a handful, offering retailers the possibility of exploiting local market power by setting prices 
according to local competitive conditions – e.g. see Competition Commission (2000, Chapter 7).  
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  Table 3 -  Aggregate Concentration in Grocery and Daily 
Goods Retailing for the European Union (1993-1999) 
 
Share of firms  
Ranked: 
 1993 1996 1999 1993-1999 
% change 
1-10   24.5 27.4 30.6 +24.9% 
11-20   11.3 12.6 12.4 +9.7% 
21-30   5.0 4.9 3.7 -26.0% 
31-40   2.9 3.0 1.8 -37.9% 
41-50   1.8 1.4 0.5 -72.2% 
Top 50   45.5 49.3 49.0 +7.7% 
Top 30   40.8 44.9 46.7 +14.5% 
Top 20   35.8 40.0 43.0 +20.1% 
Top 10   24.5 27.4 30.6 +24.9% 
 
          Source: Estimates based on data from CIR’s European Retail Handbook 
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4.    Retailer Collaboration through Buyer Groups and Alliances 
 
While consolidation is clearly an ongoing process in European grocery retailing the 
above picture is in incomplete in one key respect. Tables 2 and 3, while reflecting 
consolidation in retail markets, do not give a full indication of the concentration 
facing suppliers in terms of retail procurement markets.  In terms of purchasing 
supplies, retailers have not only sought to use their increased market share as a lever 
in negotiating with suppliers but have increasingly sought to collaborate with other 
retailers to enhance further their bargaining power.  This has had a significant impact 
at the national level for several member states where national-buying groups operate, 
but is also increasing in importance at the Community level given the development of 
cross-border buying alliances.  
 
National-level Buyer Groups 
First, in many EU countries national-level buyer groups are prominent. In terms of 
operation, the key aspect is that the buyer group purchases collectively on behalf of 
members that remain independent retailers, striving to obtain benefits and discounts 
from suppliers similar to the largest integrated retailers.  They tend to be in one of two 
forms, representing either many small retailers (e.g. Euromadi and IFA in Spain) or 
two or more larger retailers (such as Opera representing Casino and Cora in France).  
Clearly, the former type might be considered a useful counter-balance to growing 
retailer power of individual retailers.  However, their significance should not be 
understated as often they represent the single largest buyers in their country (e.g. 
Markant in Germany and Euromadi in Spain).  Moreover, in particular countries, 
notably Greece and Italy, buying groups dominate food purchasing, with the main 
players being significantly larger than any individual retail chain.   
 
In regard to the second type of national-level buyer groups, i.e. combinations of larger 
retailers, a number of these have emerged in the last few years.  In France, two very 
large buying groups have recently emerged in this manner: LUCIE (representing 
Leclerc and Systèm U) and Opera (representing Casino, Cora and Monoprix).  In 
Italy, a particular feature of recent formations of buyer groups has been the 
involvement of multinational groups.  Three instances are notable.  First, RPBL 
involves Auchan from France (through its ownership stake in Rinascente, along with 
Pam, Bennet and Lombardini). Second, Mecades involves Metro (from Germany), 
Despar (as part of the international Spar group – of which ITM now own Spar AG) as 
well as Il Gigante.  Third, CF consists of Finiper and GS/Carrefour (from France).  
Such multinational involvement is likely to spread as the wave of cross-border 
mergers and cross-shareholdings continues. 
 
Taking into account the presence of national-level buyer groups, Table 4 shows 
adjusted five-firm concentration levels across the EU member states for 1999.11  As 
can be seen, adjustments are made for eleven of the member states, in each case 
increasing the value of the concentration ratio.  The (unweighted) average across 
member states now increases by 7% points to over 60%, and only Greece and Italy lie 
below 50%.  Thus from the perspective of suppliers, national markets are noticeably 
                                                 
11   It should be noted that the presence and composition of buyer groups is continually changing in 
some national markets, Italy being the most notable with the recent emergence of new groups 
consolidating the procurement market considerably. 
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more concentrated than that indicated simply by taking account of individual retailers’ 
market shares. 
 
 
Table 4 – Five-Firm Concentration Ratios Adjusted for Buying Groups, 1999 
 Excl BG Incl BG Buying groups in top 5 
Austria 60.2 58.6  
Belgium/Lux 60.9 66.0 BLOC 
Denmark 56.4 76.6 Supervib 
Finland 68.4 70.5 Tradeka/Elanto 
France 56.3 64.7 LUCIE, ITM, Opera 
Germany 44.1 52.5 Markant 
Greece 26.8 33.5 Elomas, Eloniki, ORA 
Ireland 58.3 58.3  
Italy 17.6 26.4 ICMS, Italia Distribuzione, Intermedia, Mecades
Netherlands 56.2 71.7 SuperUnie, TSN 
Portugal 63.2 67.0 Uniarme 
Spain 40.3 63.7 Euromadi, IFA 
Sweden 78.2 80.6 Axfood Sviege 
UK 63.0 56.2  
Average 53.6 60.5  
 
     Key: “Excl (Incl) BG” means measured excluding (including) buyer groups 
     Source: Based on data from CIR’s European Retail Handbook and trade sources 
 
Cross-Border Buying Alliances 
Yet, increasingly, buyer groups are not just prominent at the national level.  A number 
of significant cross-border buying alliances have emerged in the last few years.  These 
alliances typically involve large retail organisations or national buying groups.  As 
such the level of sales under their control is very significant on a pan-European scale.  
These alliances have been typically built up on a one-member-per-state basis, ranging 
from groups with three or four members to larger ones with twelve to fifteen 
members.  Some are more formally established and open about their activities such as 
the two largest ones, European Marketing Distribution (“EMD”) and Associated 
Marketing Services (“AMS”).  While others, principally the ones with fewer members 
have a less formalised and less centralised operating structure. 
 
The typical structure of these cross-border alliances is for each of them to have only 
one member from any state (ensuring that they are generally not direct competitors in 
their respective national retail markets and thereby avoiding concerns that they might 
directly facilitate collusion at the retail level).12  In terms of activity, the alliances 
illustrate various degrees of collaboration between the sharing of buying price 
information and acting as a single purchasing unit, as well as often collaborating on 
the sourcing of private label products.13 
 
Table 5 shows the constituent members of each of the seven main alliances and their 
estimated aggregate turnover.  Their collective significance is immediately apparent in 
                                                 
12    However, the potentially negative aspect of one-member per country is that it automatically results 
in foreclosure of competitors. 
13  See Dobson Consulting (1999, Appendix 2) for further details. 
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terms of their joint turnover (even though members continue at present to purchase 
mainly on an individual basis), estimated for the seven alliances listed at over E340bn, 
i.e. around two-fifths of the total EU market estimated at E845bn for 1999. 
 
 
Table 5  -  Cross-border alliances  
Alliance (inc. members) Combined EU turnover 1998/9 
(bn Euros) 
EMD 116.8 
Markant Handels AG (Ger), ZEV Markant (Au), Euromadi (Sp), Leclerc (Fr), 
Delhaize Le Lion (B), ORA (Gr), Selex (It), Esselunga (It), Unil A/L (Nor), 
Axfood Sviege (Sw), Nisa Today’s (UK), Musgrave (Ire) 
                                               (+ EMD (Cz), Delvita (Cz), Honiker (Hun)) 
(N.B. most EMD members are national buying groups inc. wholesalers) 
AMS 81.9 
Ahold (Nl), Casino/Opera (Fr), Edeka (Ger), Dansk Supermarked (Dk), ICA 
(Sw), Hakon (N), Kesko (Fi), Jeronimo Martins (P), Superquinn (Ire), Safeway 
(UK) 
INTERCOOP/NAF INT 39.7 
Coop Italia (IT), Eroski (Sp), CWS (UK), FDB (Dk), KF (Sw), NLK (Nor), 
SOK/Tradeka (Fin), Coop Schleswig-Holstein (Ger)   
                                                                                      (+ Coop Hungary)                   
EUROGROUP 35.2 
Laurus (Nl), Rewe-Billa (Ger/Au)  
                                                                              (+Coop Schweiz (Swtz)) 
SED 27.4 
Sainsbury (UK), Esselunga (It), Delhaize “Le Lion” (Nl)                
EUROPARTNERS 21.4 
Superunie (Nl), Somerfield (UK), Cora (Fr) 
                                                        (+ Colruyt (B) – Cora (Fr), from 2000) 
BIGS 19.0 
Spar International (Ger/Gr/Dk/Au/Sp/Ire/Fr/Nor), Spar Landmark (UK), Axfood 
(Sw/Fi), Despar (IT), Laurus (Nl), Unidis (B) 
                                                                                 (+Bernag Ovag (Swtz)) 
       Source: updated from Dobson Consulting (1999) 
 
While the listed alliances do not include all the very largest retailers, they include 
many of them.  Of the top ten ranked retailers only Carrefour, Tesco, Metro, Aldi and 
Auchan are absent from the above list.14  Taking into account these five retailers, 
together with the largest five alliances, combined sales of the ten leading buying 
groups are estimated at E443bn, i.e. just over half of all EU grocery sales. 
                                                 
14  The top 10 food retailers for 1999 ranked by sales in the EU were, in descending order, Carrefour 
(43.6 bn EUROs), Intermarche (29.9), Tesco (27.1), Rewe (25.3), Aldi (25.1), Auchan (24.3), Metro 
(23.3), Edeka (23.5), Sainsbury (18.6), Leclerc (17.7) (Source: CIR’s European Retail Handbook).  
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Effects on Supplier-Retailer Relations 
Seen in this light, it is not just the activity of international expansion by the leading 
multinational retailers that is driving greater integration of markets on the 
procurement side, but also alliances of nominally independent retailers.  It is this 
combined force which food and daily goods suppliers face, affecting the prices that 
they can command increasingly at the international level when operating beyond the 
domestic level.  Such moves are having important effects on the level of supplier-
retailer relations as procurement shifts from being an activity at predominantly a 
national level to being an increasingly international one as the multinational retailers 
and cross-border alliances seek to strike common deals which apply across different 
member states. 
 
Moreover, as the inter-linkage extends between membership of national buying 
groups and cross-border alliances, as well increasingly minority shareholdings and 
full take-overs by the multinational retailers, the potential for information exchange 
and price comparison increases.  Indeed it is now possible to see the potential for 
exchange of price information across several of the cross-border alliances given the 
extent of either formal or informal linkages (i.e. whether by full or partial ownership, 
joint ventures, buying group membership or development alliances).15 
 
E-Procurement 
Further links arise from membership of global online exchanges.  A number of online 
exchanges have emerged in the last few years but two retailer-initiatives stand out.  
GlobalNetXchange (GNX) was initiated by Carrefour (France) and Sears (US) but has 
since incorporated a number of major European retailers including J Sainsbury (UK),  
Spar (Austria), and Markant and Metro (Germany), as well as retailers from other 
continents.  Meanwhile, World Wide Retail Exchange (WWRE) was established and 
has as partners Tesco and Marks & Spencer (both UK), Delhaize (Belgium), Ahold 
and Laurus (Netherlands), Dank Supermarked (Denmark), Edeka, Rewe, Tenglemann 
(Germany), Coop Italia (Italy), Auchan, Casino, Cora (France), and Hypercor (Spain), 
as well as numerous North American based retailers.  These exchanges have thus far 
focused on e-procurement of commodity and private label goods as well as on “non-
resaleables” (such as office equipment, office supplies and store fixtures).  On-line 
auctions are used to award short-term contracts to suppliers, inducing ultra-intense 
competition where the lowest price offered wins the contract.  While this has to an 
extent favoured low cost producers, the practice has encouraged marginal cost pricing 
leaving producers little or no scope to cover fixed costs with the potential damage to 
long-term investment and producer viability that may then be expected.  Moreover, 
these problems can be further exacerbated if joint buying is permitted (i.e. jointly 
organised auctions) between major members (e.g. where their collective share exceeds 
15%) or indeed such members (illegally) exchange price information (say, from 
equivalent auctions).   Given the scale of the procurement already handled by these 
                                                 
15  A number of interesting links have emerged because of new cross-border acquisitions, joint ventures 
and new national buying groups.   For instance, Laurus (Netherlands) in principle links Bloc, 
Eurogroup and BIGS.  While the Casino and Cora (France) joint buying venture, Opera, offers 
potential exchange of price information between AMS and Europartners.   Furthermore, Delhaize Le 
Lion (Belgium) appears to be a member of both EMD and SED, offering further possibilities of 
exchange of information, as does Esselunga’s (Italy) apparent membership of both SED and EMD.  
Such moves if allowed to carry on may well mean that in a short time there will be links between all 
cross-border alliances. 
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operations and the collusion possibilities that they throw up, it will be necessary for 
anti-trust authorities to ensure that retailers do not collaborate in either of these two 
respects.  
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5.  Implications for Retailers 
 
Benefits for Large Retailers 
The result of all of these developments has been particularly favourable for the largest 
retailers. On the procurement side, with their control of domestic retail markets and 
their increasing international positions, the powerful store groups are able to wield 
their bargaining power to extract beneficial trading terms from suppliers pressurised 
into making concessions in order to gain access to their customers.  The superior 
trading terms obtained by the leading retailers further reinforces their competitive 
advantage over smaller rivals, which in turn leads to further consolidation at the retail 
level.  The process is one of a virtuous circle for the very largest retailers.  Size and 
market share beget bargaining concessions from suppliers which reinforces cost 
advantages over smaller rivals enabling the large retailers to selectively reduce their 
retail prices which in turn increases the large retailers’ sales and market share, and so 
on. 
 
It is possible that national buying groups and cross-border alliances amongst smaller 
retailers may act to temper this advantage for the large integrated groups but the 
general impression is that consolidation is set to increase further at the national and 
Community level.  In particular, multinational retailers look to be particularly 
advantaged where they can use their aggregate scale to penetrate new markets while 
continuing to consolidate their existing positions.  Moreover, their advantage is even 
more apparent when they operate with hypermarkets and superstores against 
indigenous operators using small-format stores.  Here, not only does the multinational 
operator gain through its bulk buying advantages but also gains from economies of 
scale advantages at the store level (where fixed costs can be more readily spread over 
the larger store’s sales). 
 
Smaller and Specialist Retailers 
In response to these kind of advantages favouring large retail groups, it is not 
surprising that traditional, independent retailers have been in sharp decline in most 
countries over recent years.  Specialist food retailers (butchers, bakers, fishmongers, 
etc.) have been particularly hard hit where shoppers have demonstrated their 
preference for the convenience of one-stop shopping offered by the supermarket and 
hypermarket operators.  In part the rate of decline of small retailers has been lessened 
by restrictive planning regulations employed in many countries preventing or limiting 
new hypermarket store openings (e.g. the current moratorium in France).  
Nevertheless, small-format stores have survived operating as convenience stores for 
“top-up” shopping, perhaps operating through a symbol group such as Intermarché 
and Spar or by joining a buyer group to increase their purchasing power.  On the latter 
aspect, most competition authorities have taken a lenient view towards the formation 
of buyer groups so long as they do not exceed certain market share thresholds (e.g. 
20% in Sweden and 25% in Denmark). 
 
While buyer groups of small retailers have had some success in maintaining their 
viability there is an undeniable trend across the whole of the EU towards large retail 
formats employed by the large integrated groups.  Moreover, as illustrated in Table 3 
above, at the aggregate level it is the very leading groups that are pulling away from 
the rest in terms of market share.  This growth has, as shown above, occurred at the 
domestic level but increasingly retailing is becoming international and it is this factor 
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which is most likely to shape the future of food retailing in most countries as 
specialist-domestic incumbents are either taken over or outmanoeuvred by 
multinational rivals. 
 
Retailer Mergers 
Mergers amongst retailers, of course, accelerate the consolidation trend.  As yet, 
though, competition authorities have appeared unwilling to deter such consolidation 
arising through mergers unless it results in strongly dominant positions, essentially 
having a clear adverse impact on a national market.  For example the European 
Commission prohibited the proposed merger between Kesko and Tuko in Finland 
which would have offered the combined enterprise a national market share of 60%.16  
In the case of Rewe’s acquisition of Julius Meinl in Austria, store divestments were 
instructed in regions where the combined enterprise would control 65% or more.17  
However, for other mergers that have had a significant concentrating effect at the 
aggregate EU level, notably Metro/Makro18 and Carrefour/Promodès19, these have 
been allowed by the EC to proceed relatively unhindered.  Similarly, national 
competition authorities have generally shown little appetite for blocking or limiting 
greater retail concentrations.  But with each successive merger taking place and 
concentration increasing at both the national and EU levels, there is a greater prospect 
of mergers resulting in either single-firm or joint dominance.  Thus far the emphasis 
by authorities has been on consideration of unilateral effects and single-firm 
dominance.  However, the strengthening of oligopoly positions in national markets 
suggests that attention may be increasingly directed at joint dominance concerns.20 
 
 
                                                 
16   Case No IV/M.784 (OJEC L110, 26/4/1997). 
17    Case No IV/M.1221 (OJEC L274, 23/10/1998).  
18    Case No IV.M1063 (OJEC O46, 11/2/1998). 
19  Case No IV.M.1684 (25/1/2000). Here the EC focused on the procurement aspects leaving the 
French and Spanish authorities to consider retail market aspects.  There were limited conditions agreed 
with the EC, including Carrefour selling its 42% stake in Cora, while the national authorities imposed a 
limited number of store divestments in France and Spain. 
20  Such concerns have featured in an increasing number of cases handled by the European Commission 
where mergers have been prevented on grounds of oligopolistic dominance.  Though, as yet these 
grounds have not been applied by the EC to prevent a retail merger in the grocery sector.  
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6.  Implications for Producers 
 
Retailer-Led Supply Chains  
With the substantial consolidation of retail and procurement markets, the nature of the 
supply chain has changed considerably over recent years. Where manufacturers may 
traditionally have driven distribution by developing brands and then using a network 
of wholesalers and retailers to sell and distribute goods to consumers it is now 
predominantly retailers who drive the supply chain.  Large retailers have dispensed 
with the need for a separate wholesaling function by integrating this element into their 
business, in the process implementing sophisticated logistics systems based on 
regionalised warehousing with subsequent distribution to their own stores.  At the 
same time, the large retail groups have become far more active in sourcing product 
ranges to meet consumers’ needs, using electronic point-of-sale (EPoS) data to gauge 
demand more effectively, instructing suppliers to tailor products for their particular 
needs, and developing own-label product ranges to compete against manufacturer 
brands. 
 
Terms and Conditions Imposed on Suppliers 
The upshot of this revolution has been that producer market power has largely given 
way to retailer buyer power, where retailers hold the whip hand over producers.  The 
scale of operations of the major retailers and their control of purchases means that 
they are able effectively to dictate terms and conditions to producers.  Through 
aggressive bargaining strategies, including the use of de-listing tactics, and the 
increasing use of auctions for awarding contracts, retailers have been able to drive 
down the prices and margins that producers receive.  Allied to these moves has been 
the increasing use of vertical restraints placed on producers.  These buyer-induced 
restraints generally take one of two main forms: either aimed at further rent extraction 
or limiting producers’ freedom or incentives to supply elsewhere.  The first form 
includes listing charges, shelf-space fees (“slotting allowances”), promotion support 
payments and retroactive discounts on goods already sold.  The second form includes 
exclusive supply obligations and other non-compete contract clauses as well as most-
favoured-customer type contracts. 
 
As the report by the Competition Commission (2000) illustrates, these practices are 
widespread in the UK.  In its report, the Commission identified 52 practices and found 
that 30 of these when exercised by five leading retailers gave rise to a "complex 
monopoly" (i.e. they restricted or distorted competition in the market) of which 27 
were considered to be against the public interest. The Commission concluded that 
these practices should cease and argued that a Code of Practice be introduced to 
prevent such policies being used.  Subsequently, the Office of Fair Trading has 
overseen the establishment of a code binding on the four largest supermarkets (Tesco, 
Sainsbury, Asda and Safeway). These four companies have entered into formal 
undertakings that incorporate a detailed dispute resolution procedure. 
 
Moreover, such retailer practices appear not just in the UK but in other parts of 
Europe as well.  Spain, for instance, offers an interesting case where the large retailers 
commonly adopt a two-step procedure in dealing with suppliers.  In the first stage 
prospective suppliers are selected (using as criteria price, interest in the brand, 
guarantee of supply and other factors).  The second step is the elaboration of what is 
commonly called “plantillas”, in which the retailer makes explicit the concrete 
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conditions of the supply relationship.  Standard conditions include a listing fee, 
slotting allowances and end-of-aisle fees for shelf space, fixed end-of-year rebates, 
return of unsold units, contributions to special promotions, and demands for long 
terms of payment that do not match product turnover.21  
 
In addition to these contractual elements there have been regular moves by individual 
retailers in Spain to seek additional “one-off” payments after contracts have been 
agreed.  Examples include contributions to store openings, remodelling and 
extensions as well as retrospective discounts over sales in the previous period in the 
event of mergers, acquisitions (“wedding gifts”) or anniversaries.  These latter 
practices appear as deliberate exploitation of the dependency of suppliers by large 
retailers and are not unique to Spain.  Even in countries where prohibitions exist on 
practices that exploit supplier dependency such as in France (following the 1996 
Galland Law) and Germany (under the 1998 Act on Restraints on Competition – 
Gestez gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen) such practices may nevertheless continue 
given suppliers’ reluctance to bring cases to court. 
 
Impact on Supplier Competition 
While the buyer power of large retailers may have distorting effects on the retail 
market, it is clear that its most immediate effects are likely to be on competition at the 
producer level, and here again competition may be distorted.  Small producers, in 
particular, are likely to suffer when they are unable to resist retailer buyer power, 
forcing them to cut prices to the point which endangers their continued existence. The 
longer-term effect of such strong buyer power will be to threaten the viability even of 
the most efficient producers when investments are undermined by inability to recover 
fixed costs as a result of producers being forced to price at (short-term) marginal cost.  
Accordingly, even large producers may be deterred from making product and process 
investments if buyer power prevents them making an adequate return to cover the 
costs.  As a consequence, product quality, variety and innovation may suffer. 
 
As with the establishment of the Code of Practice in the UK, most concern has been 
with small suppliers that are heavily dependent on one or two key retailers for their 
livelihood.  In such instances, retailers can have total leverage over them by 
threatening to de-list their products and obtain supplies from elsewhere. Threats to de-
list are common and represent a credible retailer bargaining tactic where the loss for 
the retailer might be minimal where it can relatively easily fill its store shelves with 
other producers’ goods.  In comparison, the manufacturer may lose substantially 
where it cannot gain additional sales from other retailers causing it to lose volume 
overall and in the process raise its unit cost base considerably, placing it a competitive 
disadvantage with its rivals (OECD, 1998).  This can even apply to apparently strong 
oligopolistic manufacturers with well-recognised brands commanding significant 
market share.22  
 
                                                 
21   On the latter aspect, a typical time to payment on an invoice is around 120 days compared to other 
EU countries where 30 days appears the norm – see Cruz et al (1997) and Dobson Consulting (1999). 
22    The problem for brand producers is that consumers are more inclined to switch brands if their 
preferred brand is unavailable rather than switch stores to find their favourite brand (given the amount 
of inconvenience this causes compared to one-stop shopping).  This provides the retailer with a 
powerful leverage over even the strongest branded goods manufacturers by raising the credibility of the 
de-listing threat. 
 18
Paul W. Dobson                                                                     Retailer Buyer Power In European Markets  
Effects on Own-Label Producers 
The impact of retailer power is particularly strong on own-label producers.  
Increasingly the major retailers are using on-line Internet auctions, instead of 
traditional invited tendering processes for long-term contracts, to allocate short-term 
supply contracts where supply conditions are set in advance by the retailer with the 
lowest price bid winning the contract.  While this might encourage bidders to offer 
prices at marginal cost it clearly does not encourage producer investment where fixed 
costs cannot be recovered.  Moreover, it might encourage some producers to cut 
corners and produce sub-standard items, so adversely affecting the welfare of 
consumers.23  Such problems could potentially arise where monitoring by retailers is 
inherently imperfect or where product specifications are not set and enforced 
precisely. 
 
For producers caught in the trap of relying on key retailers for the bulk of their sales 
and offering undifferentiated products (e.g. unbranded or retailer own-label 
commodity items) then can be expected to have little defence against retailer buyer 
power.  As such only the most efficient will survive and producer markets will in such 
instances be driven towards consolidation to allow scale economies to be reaped to aid 
the chances of survival.  As a specific illustration of this, Table 6 summarises the 
supplier consolidation that has taken place in household products over the last few 
years in the face of increasing retail buyer power.24 
 
Table 6 -  Recent Supplier Consolidation in the European 
Household Products Market 
Company Outcome     Year 
Despe (Belgium) 
De Fenix (Netherlands) 
Le Nigen (France) 
Wundi (Germany) 
De Klok (Netherlands) 
Dicom (Netherlands) 
Winn Cosmetics (Germany) 
Hackmann Havi (Finland) 
Grada (Netherlands) 
Jeyes (UK) 
Sara Lee aerosols (Netherlands) 
WK Chemolux (Luxembourg) 
Reckitt / Benckiser  
Dan Lind / Clean Tabs 
Liquidated 
Liquidated 
Liquidated 
Liquidated 
Acquired by Dalli 
Acquired by Dalli 
Acquired by Dalli 
Acquired by Henkel 
Acquired by McBride 
Acquired by IWP  
Acquired by Trost 
Acquired by Henkel 
Merger 
Merger 
1995 
1997 
1999 
1999 
1992 
1995 
1997 
1997 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1999 
2001 
            Source: Trade Sources 
 
 
                                                 
23   The latter concern would be where product quality is not easily verifiable until consumed.  An 
example would be using food unfit for human consumption (e.g. see “Tesco recalls chicken in pet food 
scare”, The Guardian 25/4/2001) or the use of a chemical that breached health and safety regulations in 
the formula or packaging used. 
24  This case is used purely for illustration.  However, it is clear that producer consolidation has 
occurred in other food and daily consumer goods sectors in the context of buyer power pressures.  See 
Dobson Consulting (1999) and Dobson (2001) for studies covering household detergents, coffee, 
butter/margarine, and pet foods.  
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Producer Responses 
More generally, the response to buyer power from producers must be to seek 
economies wherever possible. With the moves to international operations by the 
leading food retailers and procurement by cross-border buyer alliances there will be 
an added incentive for producers to operate at the multinational level as well when it 
allows them to secure international contracts.  Given the time required to build new 
positions organically, producers may instead be expected to extend and adjust their 
international reach through strategic acquisitions.  It is precisely this aspect which lies 
behind much of the international acquisition and sell-off activities of the leading 
producers (e.g. Unilever/Bestfoods, PepsiCo/Quaker Oats, and Nestle/Ralston 
Purina).  Furthermore, the need for mergers that do not yield single-firm dominant 
positions has been recognised by competition authorities in their recent decisions.  
Moreover, in the cases considered, competition authorities have dismissed the 
likelihood of mergers giving rise to problems of joint dominance by the leading 
producers in the face of intense retailer power set against them, ensuring that 
producers are collectively unable to exploit any market power of their own.25   
 
Farmers at the first point of the food supply chain face pressure to cut margins and 
remain viable businesses.  This pressure comes not only from retailers directly 
sourcing fresh produce, but also from processed and packaged food manufacturers 
intent on sharing the burden that they face as a result of the exercise of retailer buying 
power.  This in turn is likely to drive further efficiencies in farming where these are 
possible, and perhaps also the defensive growth of farmers’ selling co-operatives.  But 
at a general level, the effect of retail buyer power, either directly applied or working 
its way through the supply chain, is likely to take income and money away from rural 
areas and communities and have potentially long-term detrimental effects on the 
agricultural industry when investment becomes uneconomic. 
 
Thus the process of retailer consolidation and collaboration in altering the nature of 
trading relations can be expected to have important implications for the supply chain 
as a whole.  Efficiency improvements will be encouraged by the competitive drive to 
remain viable, but the longer-term implications give cause for concern where 
producers are deterred from making appropriate investments and innovation is 
accordingly retarded.  
 
                                                 
25   See Dobson (2001) for a full discussion of these issues. 
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7.  Policy Measures 
 
Existing Problems 
As outlined above there is existing competition law and policy appropriate to the 
context of grocery retailing and procurement.  In principle, existing law and policy 
towards mergers, vertical restraints and horizontal agreements are all relevant.  
However, clear practical problems remain in regard to legal interpretation, appropriate 
jurisdiction and consistency in decisions and treatment.  These problems stem from 
three factors: the definition and measurement of buyer power, lack of clear policy 
guidelines, and vested national interests. 
 
First, there is no consensus at present on the economic and legal meaning of buyer 
power.  A number of alternative definitions have been put forward but no single one 
has been universally accepted and adopted.26  Following on from this, there has been 
no clear agreement on the appropriate measurement of buyer power.  Even in terms of 
the required market share for retailers to be able to exert significant buyer power there 
is wide disparity in levels used.  The UK Competition Commission (2000) suggests 
that 8% of the relevant market may afford buying power, the OECD (1998) suggests 
15%, while recent merger decisions of the European Commission imply 22%.27  The 
only apparent consensus is that buyer power might have detrimental effects well 
below the usual level of dominance associated with 40% market share.28  This is 
clearly an unsatisfactory situation and until definition and measurement is resolved 
there is likely to remain the prospect of inconsistent treatment between similar cases.  
 
Secondly, while it is entirely appropriate to treat mergers and restrictive practices 
(either in a horizontal or vertical form) on a case-by-case basis, there is a notable 
absence of appropriate guidelines and consensus on appropriate treatment for 
particular instances.  Case-by-case analysis arises from the need to consider and 
weigh possible efficiency gains against anti-competitive effects.  But economics has 
yielded clear insights on the situations when mergers and practices are likely to be 
pro- or anti-competitive.  Unfortunately, while these insights have been applied to the 
drawing up of guidelines on the diagnosis and treatment of seller power, there has 
been little movement towards developing corresponding guidelines on the treatment 
of buyer power.  For instance, the European Commission’s Merger Regulation 
(ECMR) focuses predominantly on output market considerations and seller power, 
while the EC’s Vertical Restraints Guidelines focus almost entirely on vertical 
restraints arising from seller power with no clear guidance and analysis offered on 
buyer-induced restraints.  Moreover, the EC Notice on the definition of the relevant 
                                                 
26  The array of definitions thus far proposed are discussed by OECD (1998), Dobson Consulting 
(1999), Bloom (2000) and Collins (2000), inter alia. 
27  On the EC merger decisions, see the discussion by Lücking (2000). 
28  The usual reason cited in support of this claim is down to differences in relative switching costs for 
suppliers and retailers (e.g. OECD (1998)).  For a supplier to be delisted by a major retailer there will 
few, if any, alternatives to make up extra sales elsewhere.  For the retailer, filling up the shelf space is 
relatively more straightforward given that alternative suppliers are available or indeed shelf space can 
be allocated to other product lines with little damage to overall sales.  The implication is not only that 
this situation places all the bargaining advantage with the retailer but that the retailer can force the 
supplier to accept terms that are anti-competitive.  Such terms might be non-cost-related discounts and 
vertical restraints that serve to restrict or distort retail competition by placing other retailers at a 
competitive disadvantage or facilitate collusion. 
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market fails to address the question of how to define procurement markets.29  It is then 
perhaps not surprising that the weight of importance attached by competition 
authorities and courts to buyer power is usually considerably less than that attached to 
seller power.   This view is reinforced by the lack of agreement amongst authorities 
on the economic significance of buyer power, unlike seller power where there is 
greater consensus on the situations where it is likely to be anti-competitive and against 
the public interest.30 
 
Thirdly, retailing has traditionally developed at the national or sub-national (i.e. 
regional or local) level.  Developments on these lines have responded to, and thereby 
reflect, national culture and history and where national and local policy towards 
retailing has shaped the retail environment considerably.  This background helps to 
explain the determination of national authorities and policy markers to retain control 
over decisions affecting retail developments in their country.  This accounts for 
persistent differences between member states in regulations concerned with planning 
restrictions, zoning laws, shop opening hours, retail pricing policy, and other matters 
concerned with retail operations when economic and social objectives are mixed. 
 
However, while retail markets persist in being at most national in geographic scope, 
the past couple of decades have seen the decline of traditional retailing in most EU 
countries and the emergence of common retail formats and so a move towards more 
similar retail environments.  This move has been accelerated by the 
internationalisation of retailing with the development of cross-border retailers.   
However, as yet, the EC has played a very limited enforcement role, continuing to 
leave policy decisions in the hands of national authorities.  Only with exception of a 
handful of merger investigations and the general application of EU competition policy 
has the Commission acted on retail developments.  Nevertheless, with moves towards 
Europe-wide procurement markets and more international retail markets resulting 
from the introduction of the Euro and the continued development of Internet-based 
shopping, it appears increasingly appropriate that the Commission should take a more 
central role in ensuring consistent competition policy towards retailing throughout the 
EU.  This will inevitably entail the Commission, rather than national authorities, 
handling an increasing proportion of merger cases and investigations of possible anti-
competitive practices employed by retailers. 
 
Role for European Commission  
In view of these three factors and the need for consistency and transparency in the 
development of competition policy and case decisions, the role of the Commission 
appears fundamental.  There is an urgent need to develop appropriate guidelines on 
the definition, implication and treatment of buyer power in regard to mergers, buyer-
induced vertical restraints and horizontal agreements.  This would necessarily entail 
new market definition guidelines that set out how procurement markets should be 
                                                 
29  Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purpose of Community 
competition law, O.J.C. 372/3 (1997).   
30    Here the UK authorities appear to be inclined towards the extreme view that retail buying power in 
isolation is likely to be of social benefit where it leads to lower prices for consumers but is anti-
competitive when it serves to reinforce retailer selling power – see Bloom (2000), for instance.  Such a 
view fails to recognise the long-run damage that buyer power on its own can cause from undermining 
supplier viability and supplier investment, potentially detrimentally affecting product quality, variety 
and innovation.  Such considerations appear to be present in those countries that have developed 
economic dependency laws, e.g. France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Spain.  
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defined.  Guidelines should also be clear on how economic trade-offs between pro-
efficiency effects and anti-competitive effects should be evaluated.  The challenge 
would be to develop guidelines that are led by the need to preserve and/or enhance 
competition but capable of taking account of relevant social factors.31  The five-step 
appraisal procedure advanced by Dobson Consulting (1999) is designed to take 
account of pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects, as well as economic 
dependency arguments if appropriate, but this needs adapting to move from being a 
theory-derived construction to being a practical policy tool.  Implicit to this approach 
would be the acknowledgement that buyer power can be exerted at less than 
traditionally dominant levels of market share and that joint dominance may be a 
particular concern in view of common practices employed by grocery retailers (as 
witnessed by the UK Competition Commission (2000)). 
 
Economic Dependency Laws 
In terms of perspective, while it is tempting to consider the extension of economic 
dependency laws as presently employed in several member states to the European 
Union as a means of tackling buying power abuse there are fundamental weaknesses 
in this approach.  First, the approach relies on the need to distinguish “fair” from 
“unfair” practice (as opposed to distinguishing between a practice that is or is not anti-
competitive).  This is an inherently normative and judgmental aspect (concerned with 
the division of economic profits between the parties concerned) as distinct from the 
more robust concept of defining what is “anti-competitive” (by virtue of decreased 
economic welfare to all society).  Second, on a practical level, firms are reluctant to 
make complaints and/or instigate court cases for fear of reprisal (resulting in lost 
business) and the uncertainty of winning a case when it is notoriously difficult to 
show (i) dependence, (ii) abuse and (iii) an effect on the market. 
 
Experience indicates that such laws have had little effect in controlling abuse of buyer 
power.  Their place appears best suited to national situations in the context of existing 
commercial law where cases can be made more effectively to cover particular abuses 
concerned with post-contractual opportunism.  This would cover cases where retailers 
have sought to use their power to change agreed terms when suppliers are already 
committed to existing arrangements.  Examples might include demand for so-called 
“wedding gifts” (where, following two retailers merging, suppliers are instructed to 
offer increased discounts or increased lump-sum payments for slotting allowances) or 
demand for retrospective funding of retailer promotions not previously agreed.  They 
might also take the form of unilateral variation of terms (e.g. over quantity or product 
specifications) without reasonable notice or reimbursement of costs or the common 
practice of delaying payments to suppliers outside of agreed contractual periods (say 
30 days from the date of invoice).  A more extreme example would be the severing of 
an ongoing supply arrangement without reasonable notice.  It is these instances of 
post-contractual opportunism on the part of retailers that might be most effectively 
tackled by economic dependency laws or a statutory supported code of practice for the 
industry. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31   These might include the position of small shopkeepers and out-of-town shopping, the preservation 
of rural communities, and the interests of farmers and other small suppliers. 
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Application of Existing EC Framework 
At the Community level the most effective way of tackling abusive buyer power 
remains the current competition framework represented by Articles 81 and 82 of the 
EC Treaty.  Yet crucial to establishing a successful approach will be appropriate 
interpretation of these articles.  In particular, dominant and jointly dominant retailer 
positions should be seen as emerging not simply from overall market shares but 
relative to the extent of supplier dependency.   Specifically, it needs to be recognised 
that buyers can abuse dominant positions when suppliers have no alternative 
economically viable route to market for their products given their present scale and 
given the existing contracts in the market.  Each case may be expected to differ but, as 
argued by the UK Competition Commission, buyer power can be associated with a 
grocery retailer having a share as low as 8% of a procurement market.  Since, even at 
this level suppliers may have little alternative but to comply with retailers’ demands 
for fear of losing critical sales which would seriously undermine their competitive 
position (given the higher unit costs which might result from reduced scale).   
Similarly, in regard of buyer-induced vertical restraints (such as listing fees, slotting 
allowances and insistence on exclusive supply) account needs to be taken of not just 
the individual share of each retailer employing these restraints but their collective 
share (given that cumulative effects are likely to exacerbate anti-competitive 
outcomes). 
 
Policy on Joint Buying 
In addition to developing appropriate policy to tackle anti-competitive behaviour of 
individual firms holding dominant or jointly dominant buying positions, a clear policy 
is required towards joint buying and the establishment and operation of buying 
groups.32  These should be treated essentially as horizontal agreements and not 
vertical agreements.33  A common EU-wide approach is increasingly required in light 
of increased cross-border purchasing activity and the extended collaboration of 
buying groups in international alliances.  At present, different countries have adopted 
different laws and policy positions on the matter of national buying groups.  A clear 
role exists for the EC to take a view on the appropriate conditions for national buying 
groups to receive exemption from present regulations.  This requires not only 
identifying an appropriate upper market share threshold (say, 15%) but also practices 
to be prohibited or exempted.34 A key requirement must be that the members of the 
alliance are not required to purchase goods through the alliance (i.e. they are free to 
negotiate individually with suppliers), thereby encouraging choice for consumers and 
supplier access to the retail market.  In addition, arrangements must not deter 
individual members from marketing their own retail businesses and lowering their 
prices directly or indirectly (i.e. no alliance induced price maintenance) or support 
                                                 
32   Some alliances have been notified to the Commission for an individual exemption under Article 
81(3) but so far no formal Commission decision has been issued (i.e. other than responses through the 
issuing of so-called “comfort letters” to the notifying parties). 
33   Presently the horizontal aspects of buying alliances are analysed under the horizontal blocked 
exemption but vertical arrangements (i.e. with suppliers and customers) are analysed under the vertical 
restraints block exemption.  Article 2(2) of the vertical restraints block exemption makes it clear that 
the block exemption only applies to buying alliances if the total aggregate turnover is less than E50m. 
34  Combined market share thresholds presently differ across different member states.  In Denmark 
chain co-operation may be allowed with 25% market share while in Sweden the upper threshold is 20% 
- see Ratliff (1998).  In Germany it appears acceptable for market shares of 10-15% to be pooled 
(Section 4(2) of the ARC – see Böge (2000)).  With conversion to an upper limit of 15% this would 
call into the question the present exemptions granted to a number of significant national-buying groups. 
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other forms of collusion serving to restrict retail competition. These principles should 
apply equally to international buying groups as well as national buying groups. 
 
In the case of international buying alliances, additional restrictions appear warranted.  
First, multiple membership of buying groups should be prohibited when it raises the 
prospect of cross-alliance exchange of price information.  This means that individual 
members of a national buying group should not be members of different national or 
international buying alliances. Secondly, to ensure that the prospects of retail 
collusion are minimised a rule of one member per country should be enforced.35 
 
In regard to online exchanges it is important that the economic benefits are allowed to 
flow from these, i.e. arising from economies of scale and reduction of transaction 
costs, as potentially there are considerable cost-savings for the industry as a whole.  
Yet joint buying by members should be prohibited (other than for members of an 
existing sanctioned buying group or where application of EC horizontal agreement 
regulation applies, i.e. up to 15% combined market share), to ensure that exchanges 
do not simply act as some super-large buying group to the benefit of already large 
individual members.  It is also crucial to ensure that retail members are not permitted 
to exchange price information (applying to both commodity items and branded 
goods).  Furthermore, to ensure that these exchanges do not operate as monopolies, 
through gaining “essential facility” status, access should be open and user/member 
costs (particularly for small retailers and small suppliers) should be kept to an 
absolute minimum (preferably on a pro-rata basis rather than a lump-sum fee). At 
present the degree of openness is unclear.  If exchanges work by invitation only then 
this may simply serve to benefit large firms.  Effective exclusion of smaller firms 
from these exchanges will have the effect of further consolidating the industry. 
 
Behavioural Remedies 
While all such measures targeting firm behaviour are likely to be useful as individual 
steps to ensure that competition remains healthy there is a general need for these to be 
consolidated in the form of a set of agreed rules covering all the above elements.   
One approach to this might be in the form of code of practice governing firm 
behaviour.  However, codes of practice are notoriously difficult to establish (for they 
need to be comprehensive in scope and rigorous in wording to avoid legal loopholes).  
They also can be expensive to monitor and oversee if they are to be properly 
implemented and followed.  Moreover, without appropriate means of redress suppliers 
are unlikely to make any complaints against large retailers when they face the 
prospect of being punished through losing future orders.  However, as a desirable way 
of controlling retailer buyer behaviour and a means of avoiding the worst forms of 
abuse associated with buying power, a comprehensive code of practice, backed up 
with a tight enforcement system, has many advantages.  Furthermore, such a code 
should be determined unilaterally by the relevant competition authority to avoid 
compromise of the principles and be designed to terminate practices that are judged to 
be anti-competitive.36  Ideally a common code would apply across the EU, usefully 
                                                 
35  An exception should be considered when one member per state results in foreclosure to competitors 
which may potentially arise if the buying alliance gains near-essential facility status. More generally, 
the measures considered here imply that the Commission needs to revisit the cases of EMD, AMS and 
Eurogroup where clearance has been implicitly given through comfort letters being issued. 
36  This centres on a particular criticism of the way that UK Code was established through consultation 
only with the supermarkets and the weakness of the wording to rule out practices which the 
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drawing on (and learning from) the UK experience of developing a code with a 
suitable dispute resolution procedure.37 
 
Striking at the Root of Retailer Power 
Nevertheless, for all its potential benefits, an underlying weakness of a code of 
practice, or indeed any individual prohibition, is that blocking particular practices 
does not necessarily solve the problem of buyer power: it attacks certain symptoms 
but not the underlying causes.  Faced with being prevented from using particular 
practices, retailers would have an incentive to search for new ways to exert buyer 
power giving rise to new forms.  Thus even if a code of practice were effective in 
ending certain practices all this may do is encourage retailers to develop new practices 
with similar effects.   This could potentially give rise to cat-and-mouse cycles where 
the code has to be continually updated to take account of new practices.  In such an 
event, striking at the causes of buyer power must seem to be more attractive in terms 
of ensuring that regulation is effective and that regulatory and compliance costs are 
restricted.  This inevitably calls for more direct action on the permitted extent of 
consolidation and collaboration in retailing.  Structural remedies imposed as a result 
of monopoly or merger investigations would help to ensure that retail competition 
remains effective (possibly through enforced store divestments or merger prohibition 
in appropriate cases) as these strike at the causes of retailer power.  But to be 
thoroughly effective, behavioural remedies (such as a comprehensive code of 
practice) have an important complementary role to play in treating the existing 
symptoms.  Such a two-pronged attack is likely to offer the best prospects of ensuring 
that the anti-competitive effects of retail buyer power are controlled, if never entirely 
eliminated, to the overall benefit of the industry and consumers. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Competition Commission had condemned as being against the public interest.  
37  For details of the UK’s Code of Practice see “Hewitt backs good behaviour code for supermarkets & 
suppliers”, DTI Press Release, P/2001/606, 31 October 2001.  The undertakings for the four 
supermarket groups having in excess of 8% market share (Asda, Safeway, J Sainsbury, and Tesco) 
required to comply with the Code are available online at www.dti.gov.uk/cp/pdfs/codeofpractice.pdf 
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8.  Summary of Conclusions 
 
 The profound changes that have taken place in food retailing over recent years 
have offered considerable economic advantages.  Heavy investment by retailers 
has allowed them to reap economies of scale through the operation of large-store 
formats and the benefits from operating large chains of stores.  This has been 
supported by the implementation of sophisticated logistics and distribution 
systems married with significant investment in new technology (such as 
Electronic Point of Sale).  The result has been significantly improved efficiency 
with greater sales per outlet and per employee. 
 
 Generally these changes have been beneficial for consumers.  Greater convenience 
has been afforded by the development of one-stop shops offering in excess of 
20,000 product lines.  It is also conceivable that lower prices have occurred where 
the cost savings from the improved efficiency have been passed on to consumers, 
even if the choice of stores available for them at a local level has been 
considerably reduced. 
 
 With further consolidation at the retail level the problem of an absence of local 
competition may be expected to increase and become a more widespread feature 
across member states.  This particular aspect calls for vigilance by competition 
authorities and consideration of whether instructed store divestments should be 
used to ensure that local competition remains effective. 
 
 At the aggregate level, grocery retailing continues to consolidate at a rapid pace in 
Europe.  The market share controlled by the largest five grocery retailers in each 
EU country has on average increased by 20% in a six-year period.  
Internationalisation of retailing has meant that ten retailers account for in excess 
of 30% of all grocery sales in the EU (up by 25% in the same six-year period).  
Present trends seem set to continue with the continued growth of the very largest 
retailers through further mergers and organic growth at the expense of smaller 
retailers. 
 
 Along with the growth of individual retailers, significant collaboration exists 
between nominally independent retailers through affiliation to national buyer 
groups and cross-border alliances.  The growing significance of the latter is 
reflected by the observation that the members of the seven leading alliances 
account for over two-fifths of all grocery sales in the EU (presently approaching 
one trillion Euros).  Added to this is the emergence of online exchanges, 
facilitating e-procurement and in the process offering further possibilities of 
collaboration amongst retailers. 
 
 Powerful positions in retail markets allow the key retail groups to take control of 
supply chains, dictating terms and conditions on suppliers enabling them to gain 
further competitive advantage over smaller rivals, which in turn leads to further 
consolidation at the retail level.  The process is one of a virtuous circle for the 
very largest retailers. 
 
 Through aggressive bargaining tactics and the increasing use of auctions for 
awarding contracts, retailers have been able to drive down the prices and margins 
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that producers receive to levels that potentially endanger the latter’s long-term 
viability and incentives to invest.  Anti-competitive concerns also arise in regard 
to the increasing use of vertical restraints by retailers; e.g. practices imposed on 
producers aimed at further profit extraction or limiting producers’ freedom or 
incentives to supply elsewhere. 
 
 Existing policy measures and law have thus far had little effect in restricting retail 
buyer power.  Economic dependency laws have generally been ineffective in 
protecting suppliers subjected to opportunistic behaviour by powerful retailers.  
Competition authorities have only in a few cases sought to prohibit retailer-
induced vertical restraints.  Moreover, authorities have generally shown little 
appetite for blocking retailer mergers thereby allowing for further retail 
consolidation. 
 
 At present there is little consistency between the approaches taken by individual 
EU countries.  A role exists for the European Commission to establish a 
comprehensive framework for tackling retailer power when it serves to prevent, 
restrict or distort competition in retail and procurement markets.   As a first stage, 
this requires establishing appropriate guidelines on the definition, implication and 
treatment of buyer power in regard to mergers, buyer-induced vertical restraints 
and horizontal agreements. 
 
 The present EC competition framework, represented by EC Treaty Articles 81 and 
82, remains the most effective way of tackling abusive buyer power.  Yet in 
regard to interpretation, dominant and jointly dominant retailer positions should be 
seen as emerging not simply from overall market shares but relative to the extent 
of supplier dependency.   Similarly, in regard of buyer-induced vertical restraints 
account needs to be taken of not just the individual share of each retailer 
employing these restraints but their collective share (given that cumulative effects 
are likely to exacerbate anti-competitive outcomes).   
 
 All joint buying arrangements need to be viewed as horizontal agreements and not 
vertical agreements.  A common EU-wide approach is required in light of 
increased cross-border purchasing activity and the extended collaboration of 
buying groups in international alliances.  This requires not only identifying a 
permitted upper market share threshold (e.g. 15%) but also specified practices to 
be prohibited or exempted. 
 
 In the case of international buying alliances, multiple membership of buying 
groups should be prohibited as it raises the prospect of cross-alliance exchange of 
price information.  This means that individual members of a national buying group 
should not be members of different national or international buying alliances.  In 
addition, to ensure that the prospects of retail collusion are minimised a rule of 
one member per country should be enforced. 
 
 In regard to online exchanges it is important that the economic benefits are 
allowed to flow from these yet have in place measures ensuring that retail 
members do not engage in joint buying or exchange price information. 
Furthermore, to ensure that these exchanges do not operate as monopolies, 
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through gaining “essential facility” status, access should be open and user charges 
minimised to encourage participation by small firms. 
 
 Developing a comprehensive code of practice has merits as a behavioural remedy 
to curb abusive retailer power and eliminate key anti-competitive practices.  
Crucial to its effectiveness would be the establishment of an enforcement system 
operated by the relevant competition authority to ensure that compliance was met.  
Ideally, a common code would apply across the EU. 
 
 To strike at the roots of retailer power, a behavioural-remedy approach needs to be 
combined with more direct action on the permitted extent of consolidation and 
collaboration in retailing.  This calls for greater use of structural remedies through 
tightening merger policy and ensuring that retail competition remains effective 
(possibly through enforced store divestments or merger prohibition in appropriate 
cases).  Such a two-pronged attack is likely to offer the best prospects of ensuring 
that the anti-competitive effects of retail buyer power are controlled to the overall 
benefit of the industry and consumers. 
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